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ARTICLE 
TRANSPARENCY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
STATE 
Adam Candeub • 
ABSTRACT 
Conventional wisdom holds that government, especially in 
its executive and administrative capacity, must be "transparent," 
disclosing how and why it makes decisions. Transparency, it is 
believed, limits corruption and encourages public participation. 
While legal scholarship has examined in detail the policy and 
legal questions about how much transparency agencies should 
provide in light of other concerns like deliberative latitude, 
privacy, or national security, scholarship has not examined the 
question of what is transparency-a concept that is not, well, 
transparent. This Article forwards a working definition of 
transparency and examines the central challenges in creating an 
administrative transparency regime. 
Most legal scholars define transparency as access to 
information. Finding this definition incomplete, this Article 
argues that transparency involves two primary elements: one 
cost-based and the other normative. First, transparency is about 
lowering the cost of accessing information, particularly the cost of 
physical access to information in real-time data. In other words, 
"transparency" or "access" does not really exist if obtaining and 
securing information is costly in either time or effort. Second, 
transparency has a "computational" or "complexity" dimension, 
which has an inevitable functional or normative dimension. 
Thanks to the faculty of IPIL and the Houston Law Review members for 
generously hosting their annual conference. I am grateful for the helpful comments and 
insights I received there. I wish to extend a special thank you to Professors Sapna Kumar 
and Greg Vetter. Finally, thanks to Barbara Bean, MSU College of Law Library, for her 
excellent research support. 
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In the administrative context, there is basic agreement 
about transparency's normative or political purposes: 
Transparency limits corruption, protects against opportunistic 
behavior by officials, and encourages public participation. This 
Article examines the form of transparency used by numerous 
statutory and regulatory regimes and suggests reform focused 
upon lowering the cost of information, both temporally and 
geographically. "Real time" disclosure will open the smoke-filled 
rooms to a more democratic cast of special interests. Finally, this 
Article examines the role of Big Data and its possibly profound 
effect upon government openness and the relationship between 
the government and the governed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Conventional wisdom holds that government, especially in 
its executive and administrative capacity, must be "transparent," 
disclosing how and why it makes decisions. 1 Transparency, it is 
believed, limits corruption and encourages public 
1. See Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685, 4685 (Jan. 21, 
2009). For instance, President Barack Obama issued a directive entitled "Transparency 
and Open Government" on his first day in office. Addressed to heads of executive 
departments and agencies, it stated, "My Administration is committed to creating an 
unprecedented level of openness in Government. We will work together to ensure the 
public trust and establish a system of transparency, public participation, and 
collaboration." Id. 
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participation.2 While legal scholarship has examined in detail 
the policy and legal questions about how much transparency 
agencies should provide in light of other concerns like 
deliberative latitude, privacy, or national security,3 scholarship 
has not examined the question of what is transparency-a 
concept that is not, well, transparent. This Article forwards a 
working definition of transparency and examines the central 
challenges in creating an administrative transparency regime. 
Most legal scholars define transparency as access to 
information.4 Finding this definition incomplete, this Article 
argues that transparency involves two primary elements: one 
cost-based and the other normative. First, transparency is 
mostly about lowering the cost of accessing information, 
particularly about lowering the cost of physical access to 
information and real-time data. "Transparency" or "access" 
does not really exist if obtaining and securing information is 
costly in either time or effort. An agency is not transparent if 
its records can be inspected in one office three days a week 
between ten o'clock and noon. 
Second, transparency has a "computational" or "complexity" 
dimension, which has an inevitable functional or normative 
2. See Mark Fenster, The Transparency Fix: Advocating Legal Rights and Their 
Alternatives in the Pursuit of a Visible State, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 443, 473-74, 491 (2012) 
("The digital-transparency movement, by contrast, imagines a state that is defined by its 
data and the flow of information to and from it rather than by its actions, that is more 
immediately responsive to the public and allows extensive citizen participation and 
collaboration, and that provides a 'platform' for government services and for the provision 
of public informational goods."); Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government 
Speech, 56 HAsTINGS L.J. 983, 989 (2005) ("[T]he constitutional commitment to political 
accountability counsels governmental actors to ensure the transparency of government 
communications .... "); Catharina Lindstedt & Daniel Naurin, Transparency Is Not 
Enough: Making Transparency Effective in Reducing Co"uption, 311NT'L POL. Sci. REV. 
301, 302-05 (2010) (arguing that effective transparency requires the information be made 
public, easily accessible, and encourage political accountability). 
3. See, e.g., Mark Fenster, Disclosure's Effects: WikiLeaks and Transparency, 97 
IOWA L. REV. 753, 782-83 (2012); Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 
74 CALIF. L. REv. 889, 895-96 (1986). 
4. See Ann Fiorini, Introduction: The Battle over Transparency, in THE RIGHT TO 
KNOW: TRANSPARENCY FOR AN OPEN WORLD 1, 5 (Ann Fiorini ed., 2007) (defining 
transparency as "the degree to which information is available to outsiders that enables 
them to have informed voice in decisions and/or to assess the decisions made by insiders"); 
William Mock, On the Centrality of Information Law: A Rational Choice Discussion of 
Information Law and Transparency, 17 J. MARsHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1069, 1075, 
1082 (1999) (defining "transparency" as "a measure of the degree to which the existence, 
content, or meaning of a law, regulation, action, process, or condition is ascertainable or 
understandable by a party with reason to be interested in that law, regulation, action, 
process, or condition"); Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1339, 1343 ("Transparency is about availability and accessibility, but these 
attributes of transparency are agnostic on the question of who might take advantage of 
that availability or accessibility and at what cost."). 
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dimension.5 Individuals can compute further inferences and 
deductions from information they are given. These inferences can 
be easy or hard. Consider the inferences needed to determine the 
influence of a large political donor. On one hand, Federal 
Election Commission disclosures show precise amounts given to 
particular candidates.6 In order to determine whether a donor is 
a major fundraiser or "bundler," however, one needs detailed 
biographical information, such as where the putative bundler 
works or who attends his fundraising parties, in order to link him 
or her to a network of other wealthy donors. "How much did X 
contribute?" is a simple, computationally transparent issue. "Is X 
a major bundler?" is a computationally complex, nontransparent 
question. 
Because questions differ as to their informational 
complexity, computational transparency is relative to the 
question that you ask; it has a normative component. Take an 
example from current debates in health privacy law concerning 
"personally identifiable information."7 Many wish to release 
health records for research purposes, but many also demand that 
such records be scrubbed of "personally identifiable information" 
to protect privacy.8 The problem is that information which 
contains sufficient detail to have epidemiological use can be 
personally identifiable, even if no name is attached. For instance, 
consider a record indicating that a male in ZIP code 89078, born 
on July 7, 1975, received treatment for gonorrhea. This bit of 
information seems unidentifiable, except that, for many, perhaps 
most, ZIP code, birth date, and sex are sufficient to identify 
5. See Felix T. Wu, Defining Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, 84 U. COLO. L. REv. 
1117, 1152-53 (2013); see also Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH 1, 55 (2011) (arguing that human knowledge and discretion may be necessary 
for a data set to reveal certain information). 
6. Search Campaign Finance Data by Individual Contributor, FED. ELECTION 
COMM'N, http://www.fec.gov/finance/d.isclosure/norindsea.shtml (last visited Nov. 17, 
2013). 
7. See, e.g., Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising 
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1701, 1736-37 (2010) (discussing 
deidentification in the health privacy context); Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The 
PI! Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1814, 1877-78 (2011) (promoting a model of PII which distinguishes between 
identified, identifiable, and nonidentifiable persons); Wu, supra note 5, at 1121-22 
(questioning whether removing personally identifiable information is sufficient to protect 
privacy); see also Justin Brickell & Vitaly Shmatikov, The Cost of Privacy: Destruction of 
Data-Mining Utility in Anonymized Data Publishing, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 14TH ACM 
SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 70, 
70 (2008), available at http://www .cs. utexas.edu/ -shmat/shmat_kdd08. pdf. 
8. See Ohm, supra note 7, at 1708. 
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particular individuals.9 That Mr. Jones has gonorrhea can be 
deduced rather easily and cheaply from other information (ZIP 
code and sex), given readily available Internet search indices. On 
the other hand, relative to your interest into whether Mr. Jones 
prefers Coke to Pepsi or watching college basketball to college 
football, a ZIP code, date of birth, and sex reveal much less. 
Because transparency depends on a functional or normative 
matter-i.e., what types of information you want-computational 
transparency, more so than transparency over time or distance, 
presents normative questions.10 
In the administrative context, there is basic agreement 
about transparency's moral or political purposes: Transparency 
limits corruption, protects against opportunistic behavior by 
officials, and encourages public participation.11 Some speak of 
public participation as allowing individuals to have their voices 
heard to improve democratic processes12 and further more 
informed agency deliberation.13 
9. See Latanya Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely 2, 
16 (Carnegie Mellon Univ., Data Privacy Working Paper No. 3, 2000), available at 
http://dataprivacylab.org/projects/identifiability/paperl.pdf. ("About half of the U.S. 
population (132 million of 248 million or 53%) are likely to be uniquely identified by only 
{place, gender, date of birth}, where place is basically the city, town, or municipality in 
which the person resides. And even at the county level, {county, gender, date of birth} are 
likely to uniquely identify 18% of the U.S. population. In general, few characteristics are 
needed to uniquely identify a person."). 
10. Compare id. (discussing computational aspects of disclosing personally 
identifiable information), with Tamara Keith, How Congress Quietly Overhauled Its 
Insider-Trading Law, NPR (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/04/ 
16/177 496734/how-congress-quietly-overhauled-its-insider-trading-law (noting that while 
financial disclosures are available, they can only be obtained by traveling to Washington, 
D.C.). 
11. See Schauer, supra note 4, at 1346-49 (delineating four purposes of 
transparency: "Transparency as Regulation, Transparency as Democracy, Transparency 
as Efficiency, and Transparency as Epistemology"). Frederick Schauer considers 
transparency as a form of regulation to limit corrupt or otherwise undesirable behavior 
and "a useful facilitator of public decision making ... an important component of 
democratic governance." Id. at 1347-49. 
12. Mark Fenster, Seeing the State: Transparency as Metaphor, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 
617,628 (2010); Tina Tchen, Make Your Voice Heard, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 23, 2010, 2:57 
PM), http://www. whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/02/23/make-your-voice-heard. 
13. Mary Holper, The New Moral Turpitude Test: Failing Chevron Step Zero, 76 
BROOK. L. REV. 1241, 1271, 1306-07 (2011). 
As Attorney General [Eric H.) Holder stated during his confirmation hearings, "I 
firmly believe that transparency is a key to good government. Openness allows 
the public to have faith that its government obeys the laws. Public scrutiny also 
provides an important check against unpersuasive legal reasoning-reasoning 
that is biased toward a particular conclusion." 
Id. at 1306-07 (quoting Nomination of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Nominee to Be Attorney 
General of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
257 (2009) (statement of Eric H. Holder, Jr.)). 
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There is, however, another view of public participation's 
purpose-one that might seem cynical, but arguably more 
realistic, and gives the proper normative approach to 
administrative transparency. Government agencies do not 
deliberate upon high-minded principles; they broker deals, adjust 
various political and economic interests, and agencies extract 
rents in various forms for their efforts.14 Parties get what they 
want by rewarding or threatening agency decision-makers 
through bringing to play various political and economic 
influences. 15 Given the inevitably closed-door nature of these 
deals, effective public participation requires information as to 
when the deals are being made so that pressure can be brought 
at the right time. True transparency must make information 
cheap and in "real time" so that these deals are brokered in the 
most democratic way possible. 
This Article examines the form of transparency used by 
numerous statutory and regulatory regimes and suggests reform 
focused upon lowering the cost of information, both temporally 
and geographically, as well as providing "real-time" disclosure to 
open the smoke-filled rooms to a more democratic cast of special 
interests. 
II. REAL-TIME AND PHYSICAL TRANSPARENCY 
Transparency is often a question of physical access to 
information in a timely manner.16 Consider the recent uproar 
involving the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act (the 
STOCK Act).17 Passed in reaction to sensational accounts of 
leading members of Congress trading on insider information, 18 
14. Rui Baptista, Culture, Political Institutions, and the Regulation of Entry, 28 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL 'y J. 785, 786 (2007). 
15. Id. at 786 ("Another strand of the 'public choice' theory holds that politicians 
and bureaucrats are the main beneficiaries of government regulation as they use it to 
extract rents from incumbents and potential entrants in the form of campaign 
contributions, votes, and bribes." (citing HERNANDO DESOTO, THE OTHER PATH (1989))). 
16. See Keith, supra note 10 (contesting the transparency of a database of financial 
disclosures that are only available in Washington, D.C.). 
17. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 
Stat. 291; see Keith, supra note 10 (highlighting concerns that the amended Stock Act 
reduces transparency). 
18. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Op-Ed., Congress's Insider-Trading Non·Scandal, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2011, at A15. These accounts include a November 2011 60 Minutes 
television investigation entitled "Insiders" by journalist Steve Kroft, who confronted 
congressional leaders, like Nancy Pelosi, about their and their family members' trading on 
nonpublic information. See Insiders: The Road to the STOCK Act (CBS News television 
broadcast Nov. 13, 2011), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504803_162-
57323518-10391709/confronting-pelosi-on-insider-trading/. In addition, a 2011 book 
written by Peter Schweizer, President of the Government Accountability Institute and the 
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the STOCK Act requires disclosure "[n]ot later than 30 days 
after receiving notification of any [applicable financial] 
transaction ... but in no case later than 45 days after such 
transaction. "19 While the Ethics in Government Act of 197820 
had long required annual disclosure of federal officials' 
securities transactions, 21 the STOCK Act expanded upon these 
disclosures. The STOCK Act required the disclosures to be 
made available online, while the Ethics in Government Act 
merely mandated paper records. 22 Finally, the STOCK Act 
increased the coverage of the required disclosure, expanding 
the Ethics in Government Act's scope to members of Congress 
and their employees, as well as executive branch officials who 
occupy "a position classified above GS-15."23 
On April 15, 2013, President Obama quietly amended the 
STOCK Act to eliminate the online requirements for the vast 
majority of covered individuals but retained some of the other 
disclosure requirements.24 According to press accounts, the 
Senate considered the amendment for ten seconds-and the 
House for fourteen seconds, with passage in both houses by 
unanimous consent. 25 The disclosure statements, no longer 
online, are still available on paper but only in the basement of 
William J. Casey Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, sheds light on 
the extent of congressional trading on insider information. PETER SCHWEIZER, THROW 
THEM ALL OUT: How POLITICIANS AND THEIR FRIENDS GET RICH OFF INSIDER STOCK TIPS, 
LAND DEALS, AND CRONYISM THAT WOULD SEND THE REST OF US TO PRISON 44-45 
(2011). 
19. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 § 6; see also JACK 
MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42495, THE STOCK ACT, INSIDER TRADING, AND 
PUBLIC FINANCIAL REPORTING BY FEDERAL OFFICIALS 1 (2013). 
20. 5 U.S.C. app. § 101 (2012). 
21. Id. § 101(c)-(e). 
22. Id. § 105(b)(1); Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 
§ 11(b); see also MASKELL, supra note 19, at 3 (explaining that disclosures are made 
accessible "to the public for viewing at the office of the agency ethics officer, or a copy 
may be furnished to those requesting a copy"). 
23. 5 U.S.C. app. § 101(0(3); Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 
2012 §§ 8(a)(l), 11(a)(1). 
24. Act of Apr. 15, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-7, 127 Stat. 438 (2013) (rendering 
ineffective sections 8(a) and 11(a) of the STOCK Act); Steven T. Dennis, Obama Signs 
Partial Repeal of STOCK Act, ROLL CALL (Apr. 15, 2013), 
http://www.rollcall.com/news/ 
obama_signs_partial_repeal_of_stock_act-2240 19-1.html. 
25. Dennis Kleinfeld, Change in Insider Trading Law Protects Politicians, Not 
You, MONEYNEWS (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.moneynews.com/Kleinfeld/Congress-
STOCK-Act-insider-trading-vote/2013/04/22/id/500637; David Lawder & Richard 
Cowan, Congress Quietly Repeals Plan for Internet Financial Disclosures, REUTERS 
(Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04112/net-us-usa-congress-
security-idUSBRE93BOZJ20130412. 
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the Cannon House Office Building.26 Good government groups 
and others denounced Congress for betraying the STOCK Act's 
transparency goals. 27 
Of course, under both the original and amended STOCK Act, 
information was "accessible."28 The difference--the difference 
that inspired outrage-was the cost of obtaining information. By 
providing information online and close to real time, the original 
version lowered cost across all times and physical distances. The 
amended STOCK Act made the information almost prohibitively 
costly, particularly if you lived in Alaska and wanted information 
about a transaction the day after it was completed. 
Perhaps the most important government transparency 
statutory regime is the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).29 
Amended in 1974, FOIA requires disclosure of documents in the 
possession of all federal agencies, subject to large exceptions for 
classified documents, personnel records, specifically exempted 
records, trade secrets and privileged information, certain inter-
agency and intra-agency memorandums, personnel and medical 
records, records complied for law enforcement, documents related 
to regulating financial institutions, and geological and 
geophysical information.30 According to which commentator you 
read, FOIA has been either a success or a failure. On the plus 
side, it certainly has led to more disclosure.31 On the minus, many 
26. Keith, supra note 10. 
27. See, e.g., Lawder & Cowan, supra note 25 ("Lisa Rosenberg of the Sunlight 
Foundation, a nonprofit public interest group, said the repeal 'undermines the intent' of 
the law to ensure that govemment insiders are not profiting from nonpublic information. 
'Are we going to retum to the days when the public can use the Intemet to research 
everything except what their govemment is doing?'"); see also Craig Holman, Shame on 
Congress for Repealing Major Provision of STOCK Act; Obama Should Veto, PUB. CITIZEN 
(Apr. 12, 20 13), http://www .citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.cfm ?ID=3863. 
28. Compare Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 §§ 8, 11 
(requiring online financial disclosures for members of Congress, congressional staff, and 
certain executive branch employees), with Act of Apr. 15, 2013 § 1 (providing that the 
online disclosure provision of the STOCK Act shall not take effect). 
29. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); RonNell Andersen Jones, 
Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy in a Post-Newspaper America, 68 WASH. & LEE L. 
REv. 557, 598 (2011). 
30. 5 U.S. C. §§ 552(a), (b)(1)-{9). 
31. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of 
Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1015--16 (2008) ("FOIA must be understood as 
functioning within a broader ecology of transparency. As part of that system, it has done 
underappreciated service in the past half-decade and partakes of virtues of resiliency and 
efficacy that should be acknowledged and preserved."); David S. Levine, Bring in the 
Nerds: Secrecy, National Security, and the Creation of International Intellectual Property 
Law, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 105, 149 (2012) ("[T]he continued success of FOIA in 
revealing information that some in govemment would rather be kept from the public 
means that a public official's personal ability to keep information from the public only 
goes so far."); Daniel E. Toomey & Joseph S. Ferretti, The Freedom of Information Act: A 
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argue that FOIA has done little to eliminate unreasonable 
government secrecy or provide genuine insight into government 
ki 32 wor ngs. 
Much of the dissatisfaction with FOIA stems from its lack of 
real-time transparency.33 If you consider transparency as 
allowing all interested groups, both those with and without high-
priced lobbyists, to bring pressure, then FOIA is fairly useless. 
First, FOIA only reveals information memorialized in some 
document, and the details of sub rosa deals are not 
simultaneously, or even ever, so memorialized.34 Second, FOIA 
gives agencies twenty days to respond to a request for records.35 In 
reality, they usually take much more time.36 And, if agencies do not 
so comply, the remedies-going to court and attempting to obtain 
Refresher and Primer for the Construction Lawyer, CONSTRUCTION LAw., Winter 2011, at 
17 ("The Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), facilitating broad access to public 
documents, has been a part of the legal landscape for 43 years. As a testament to the 
success of the concept, most states (and many counties and municipalities) have their own 
version of FOIA, based largely on the federal version, and often rely upon federal courts' 
interpretations in determining how to apply their own statutes."); Aziz Z. Huq, Binding 
the Executive (by Law or by Politics), 79 U. Cm. L. REV. 777, 795 n.74 (2012) (reviewing 
ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN 
REPUBLIC (2010)) ("While both [the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978] and 
FOIA have their limits, and have been violated, neither is a wholesale failure."). 
32. See, e.g., Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 
27 YALE L. & POL 'y REV. 399, 406 (2009) ("[A]t its best, FOIA only facilitates access to 
specific records; it does not and cannot alter the practices and procedures that make them 
inaccessible in the first place. Thus, indispensable as it was and remains, FOIA did not 
provide an effective remedy for the excesses of government secrecy .... "); Michael Herz, 
Law Lags Behind: FOIA and Affirmative Disclosure of Information, 7 CARDOZO PuB. L. 
POL 'y & ETHICS J. 577, 578 (2009) ("This article will describe and comment on the way in 
which FOIA has become more peripheral than it once was and than it should be. FOIA's 
fundamental limitation is its failure to impose affirmative responsibilities on agencies."); 
Michele Bush Kimball, Shining the Light from the Inside: Access Professionals' 
Perceptions of Government Transparency, 17 COMM. L. & POL'Y 299, 299 (2012) 
("Hundreds of audits of open government statutes across the United States during 
the past fifteen years have one finding in common: Not once has there been complete 
compliance with transparency statutes." (citing Michele Bush Kimball, Mandated 
State-Level Open Government Training Programs, 28 Gov'T INFO. Q. 474, 474 
(2011))). 
33. See S. REP. No. 110-59, at 3 (2007) ("Chief among the problems with FOIA 
are the major delays encountered by FOIA requesters."); Herz, supra note 32, at 583 
("Of course, in the real world, these firm and strikingly short deadlines are routinely 
exceeded. Delays in handling FOIA requests seem to be an ineradicable feature of the 
statute's administration."). 
34. See Herz, supra note 32, at 584-85 (suggesting that public access to 
information results in a "disincentive to create records"). 
35. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A). 
36. Findings Regarding Administrative Processing of FOIA Requests, NAT'L 
SEC. ARCHIVE, http://www .gwu.edu/ -nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB84/findings 
admin.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) ("[M]ost agencies are unable to substantively 
respond to an [sic] FOIA request within 20 days."). 
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mandamus or injunctive relief-take more time.37 In short, if your 
goal is to line up an impressive writing campaign from members of 
Congress and interested citizens to influence a bureaucrat's 
decision, FOIA is not going to tell you much. 
The importance of up-to-date information-and dissemination 
of that information-has long been evidenced in legislative 
struggles. Indeed, one of lobbyists' chief duties is to provide clients 
with the most up-to-date information-not publicly availabl&-So 
that their clients can engage in more effective deal-making.38 To 
demonstrate the point, compare FOIA's relative ineffectiveness to 
the tremendous success of leading Internet firms, like Google, to 
block the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect IP Act 
(PIPA).39 These two bills, which Congress considered in 2012, would 
have greatly increased the liability of Internet firms to police and 
monitor users for potential copyright violations.40 These bills can be 
fairly interpreted as legislative sops to the content industry, with 
groups such as the Motion Pictures Association of America and the 
Recording Industry Association of America pushing the bill. 41 As 
many have lamented, intellectual property laws are the product of 
these types of political pressure and capture. 42 Many expected a 
37. Id.; see, e.g., Ning Ye v. Holder, 624 F. Supp. 2d 121, 122-24 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(discussing the writ of mandamus in the FOIA context). 
38. Sharyl Attkisson, Behind the Closed Doors of Washington Lobbyists, CBS NEWS 
(Oct. 7, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/2102-3445_162-57527490.html. 
39. Dana Liebelson, New Cybersecurity Act Would Undermine FOIA and 
Whistleblower Protections, PROJECT ON GoVERNMENT OVERSIGHT BLOG (Feb. 17, 2012, 
1:55 PM), http:/lpogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2012102/new-cybersecurity-act-would-
undermine-foia-and-whistleblower-protections.html; Ned Potter, 'Wikipedia Blackout,' 
SOPA and PIPA Explained, ABC NEWS (Jan. 17, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/ 
technology/2012/01/wikipedia-blackout-sopa-and-pipa-explained/; Take Action, GoOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/takeactionl (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
40. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. §§ 102(b)(3), (c) (2011); Protect 
IP Act of2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. § 3(d) (2011). 
41. See Derek Broes, Why Should You Fear SOPA and PIPA?, FORBES (Jan. 20, 
2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/derekbroes/2012/0l/20/why-should-you-fear-sopa-and-
pipal ("The birth of SOPA and PIPA has been established through the efforts of the 
lobbying arms of the studios and labels The MP AA and RIAA. "); Stephanie Condon, 
SOPA, PIPA: What You Need to Know, CBS NEWS (Jan. 18, 2012), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57360665-503544/sopa-pipa-what-you-need-to-
know/. 
42. See Rick Boucher, Limiting Progress of Science and Useful Arts: Legislating as a 
Means of Enhancing Market Leverage, 18 STAN. L. & POL 'y REV. 7, 13-18 (2007); Erika 
Morphy, A Timely Reminder that MPAA and RIAA Shouldn't Be Trusted with Too Much 
Enforcement Power, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikamorphy/ 
2012/01123/a-timely-reminder-that-mpaa-and-riaa-shouldnt-be-trusted-with-too-much-
enforcement-power/3/ (discussing the forceful manner with which copyright owners have 
used lobbying power and campaign donations in recent attempts to push copyright 
legislation through Congress). 
In recent years, however, Congress increasingly has been asked by 
copyright owners to use [the Article I power "[t]o promote the Progress of 
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PIPA or SOPA-like bill to pass given the past success of the content 
industry's similar legislation, such as the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act of 1998.43 The success of these prior laws stems, in 
part at least, by the quiet way they were pushed through 
Congress.44 
Something different happened in 2012. Google and other 
Internet firms that would have borne significant compliance costs 
under PIPA or SOPA launched a campaign against these proposed 
laws.45 Through tactics like "going black for a day," Internet firms 
brought the information to the public-and tremendous public 
pressure on Congress-just as it was preparing votes on these 
measures.
46 While the information about these votes was always 
there, the opposing Internet firms rendered this information easy to 
get at the right time. In legislation, as in life, timing is vital. 
The temporal transparency of various types of administrative 
procedure has been too little examined. While the merits of various 
types of administrative procedures, including formal rulemaking, 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"] 
to stifle the development of new technology. Over the past two years in 
particular, the legislative process in the copyright field seems principally 
focused on leveraging private-sector behavior rather than in achieving 
actual changes to the law. No doubt my colleagues who have introduced 
legislation to modify the Copyright Act have done so out of a sincere desire 
to address concerns raised by content owners. Nonetheless, it increasingly 
appears that the private-sector interests pushing these initiatives see the 
legislative process as a mechanism to encourage manufacturers of consumer 
electronics to 'design out' features to which they object, to discourage them 
from introducing new products, or to leverage them to pay increased 
royalties as the price for peace. 
Boucher, supra, at 7-8 (footnotes omitted); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
43. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998); 
see also Boucher, supra note 42, at 8-9, 18-19 (predicting that Congress will enact 
legislation favoring the interests of content owners over the fair use rights of consumers); 
Bill D. Herman, A Political History of DRM and Related Copyright Debates, 1987-2012, 
14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 162, 214 (2012) ("(T]he conventional political analysis would have 
cast the odds of something like SOPA passing as very strong."). 
44. David Nimmer & PeterS. Menell, Sound Recordings, Works for Hire, and the 
Termination-of-Transfers Time Bomb, 49 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y USA 387, 391-92 (2001). 
45. Condon, supra note 41. 
46. Lewis Dowling, Internet Giants Threaten 'Blackout' Protest Against SOPA, 
TOTAL TELECOM (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.totaltele.com/view.aspx?ID=470424 
("Wikipedia founder, Jimmy Wales and Website entrepreneur Ben Huh have declared 
their support for a coordinated protest against controversial U.S. antipiracy legislation. 
Their announcements follow a similar one made by user-driven news Website Reddit, 
which declared on Tuesday that it will be 'blacking out' on 18 January from Sam to 
Spm .... "); Wikipedia Blackout: 11 Huge Sites Protest SOPA, PIPA on January 18, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/17/wikipedia-
blackout_n_l212096.html (reporting that over 7,000 websites participated in the opposition 
campaign by either "going dark" or directing visitors towards information on SOPA and PIP A). 
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informal rulemaking, and adjudication, have been debated ad 
nauseum, little attention has been devoted to how these procedures 
differ in transparency.47 In other words, among the various 
administrative procedures, does one provide "real-time 
transparency'' to shed light on events as they are occurring so that 
individuals can effectively influence the procedure? 
Formal rulemaking, as set forth in sections 556 and 557 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act,48 is transparent in theory yet may be 
less so in practice.49 Under formal rulemaking, an agency entity 
(board, commissioner, administrative law judge, or some other body 
or individual) receives information during a trial-like proceeding, 
with a record of all argument and evidence formally entered-
subject to examination by the opposing party. 5° Formal rulemaking 
is transparent because all evidence that the decision-maker should 
rely upon is public. Further, ex parte discussions are generally 
prohibited so that the decision-maker can only make his decision on 
the formally presented evidence. 51 
The problem is, of course, that the agency can exert pressures 
on the decision-makers, which can escape public view. On one hand, 
some agencies require from their decision-makers judicial-like 
silence on pending matters, strictly prohibiting ex parte contacts or 
opportunities for improper influence. 52 On the other hand, where 
the decision-makers lack lifetime tenure and rely on their 
bosses for advancement, their employing agencies can exert 
4 7. See, e.g., Michael Ray Harris, Intervention of Right in Judicial Proceedings to Review 
Informal Federal Rulemakings, 40 HOFSTRA L. REv. 879, 881-82, 886, 904--05 (2012) 
(discussing the uses of administrative actions under the Administrative Procedure Act while 
omitting debate of their various levels of transparency); Edward Rubin, It's Time to Malre the 
Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 110-12 (2003) 
(debating the effectiveness of rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act 
without discussion ofrulemaking's transparency). 
48. 5 u.s.c. §§ 556--557 (2012). 
49. CARY COGLIANESE, HEATHER KILMARTIN & EVAN MENDELSON, TRANSPARENCY 
AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS: A NONPARTISAN 
PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION TASK FORCE REPORT vi (2008), available at 
http://www .hks.harvard.edulhepg/ 
Papers/transparency Report. pdf. 
50. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d); VANESSA K BURROWS & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R41546, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 3 (2011). 
51. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(l); BURROWS & GARVEY, supra note 50, at 3. 
52. See, e.g., Rules of Practice and Procedure for Administrative Hearings Before 
the Office of Administrative Law Judges, 29 C.F.R. § 18.38 (2012) ("The administrative 
law judge shall not consult any person, or party, on any fact in issue unless upon notice 
and opportunity for all parties to participate."); id. § 2200.105 (restricting ex parte 
communications between parties to a case not yet concluded and an administrative law 
judge, the commissioner, or other employees of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Review Commission). 
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influence.53 Agency decision-makers are more susceptible than 
federal judges by sub rosa influence from special interests.54 
Over the last few decades, agencies have largely abandoned 
formal rulemaking, opting instead for informal rulemaking. 55 
Agencies publish a proposed rule and interested parties submit 
comments.56 Agencies often will also meet ex parte with parties and 
discuss matters, although there are no formal hearings. 57 From a 
transparency perspective, there are clear disadvantages to this 
approach. It is much more difficult to keep track of who is speaking 
to whom; the various bits of evidence (and their sources) are more 
obscure and difficult to assemble, requiring combing through 
agency filings. 58 
Online record systems that document these meetings and 
submissions can eliminate some of these concerns. Consider the 
Federal Communications Commission's Electronic Comment Filing 
System (ECFS).59 It places all written submissions on the Internet a 
53. See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints 
on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 468 (1999) (recognizing improper political 
influence in administrative agencies through "managerial techniques" that influence 
low level decision-makers such as basing performance evaluations on the outcome of a 
matter). 
54. Compare id. (recognizing that lower-level decision-makers in administrative 
agencies are susceptible to influence by those who control their career advancement), with 
THOMAS F. HOGAN, THE FEDERAL COURT SYsTEM IN THE UNITED STATES: AN INTRODUCTION 
FOR JUDGES AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATORS IN OTHER COUNTRIES 9 (2010), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourt&'Publications/English.pdf (arguing that life 
tenure and guaranteed compensation insulate Article III federal judges from outside 
influence). 
55. Harris, supra note 47, at 905 n.l63 ("It should also be noted that while both formal 
and informal rulemaking are available to an agency under Section 553 of the APA ... formal 
rulemaking procedure is rarely, if ever, utilized by modern administrative agencies."); Rubin, 
supra note 47, at 106--07 (2003) (noting that "formal rulemaking has turned out to be a null 
set" and because "the impracticalities of formal rulemaking are well known, Congress rarely 
requires this technique, and courts avoid interpreting statutes to require it, even in the rare 
cases where the statute seems to do so"). 
56. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c). 
57. See, e.g., Permit-But-Disclose Proceedings, 47 C.F.R. § 1.1206 (2012) (requiring 
notice for all oral ex parte presentations in "permit-but-disclose proceedings," not just those 
involving new information or arguments); Amendment of the Commission's Ex Parte Rules and 
Other Procedural Rules, 26 FCC Red. 4517, 4521 (2011); Commission's Ex Parte Rules and 
Other Procedural Rules, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,376 (May 2, 2011) (providing that notice was only 
required for ex parte communication if the information or argument was not already in the 
record); see also Commission's Ex Parte Rules and Other Procedural Rules, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,551 
(May 26, 2011) (announcing that the Federal Communication Commission adopted the permit-
but-disclose proceedings, now available in the C.F.R., and that it would be effective June 1, 
2011). 
58. See 1 C.F.R. § 305.77-3 (1993); Amendment of the Commission's Ex Parte Rules 
and Other Procedural Rules, 26 FCC Red. at 4521. 
59. See Electronic Comment Filing System, FED. COMMC'NS CoMM'N, 
http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
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few days after receipt. 60 In addition, the FCC has fairly strict 
disclosure requirements for ex parte meetings. 61 Parties disclose by 
letter to the FCC with whom they met and what they discussed, 
though at a high level of generality. 52 Reports are relatively easy to 
produce so that interested parties can keep track of who is meeting 
whom.63 And, indeed, it is part of most communications law 
associates' jobs in big Washington firms to keep track of who is 
speaking to which commissioner. ECFS can produce reports like the 
following that show what parties met which bureau and what 
proceeding was discussed: 
Figure 1: Federal Communications Commission, 
Sample ECFS Report 
i~l3 ··~~.2."~YQiu~~----·,:;rn~······~~~~i:.G;·H;············ 
"·· ~--~·-"' --- ..... -- . . ... ~ -·.,"·-···-······~---~- .. ;.,.-;_ ···--··--···~····-~~ --· ·- . ,._ ____ ]:~-~- ....... ···---·-··--·~ 
OHlS,!Oll DOC nn: lEITER PROCE!lll:\"G: 96-93 
[i~u · ·~.r{'ij;,(roiEi, 
.. 
A 'IT: 
W06120ll DOC TYPlO COMMENT 
;~:~ ··::L~~~r~~;· r:;~[:r:" .,f;.;~~;~·: .... ~~~&. 
0&17!2011 DOC n'P£: NOTICE Of EXPAR'I'f. 
EXI'.UU: Al'l'l: <ioo8l< In<. 
ATT: E.A<hlDAJ-. 
i0iililii1···:;:~·=:f~:~ f~j;~ .. ~--.. """"::~r····--Pi«iemi5G,·H·;;; · · 
' . APPL: ACSol~""' i' 
07-'li:lOU 
EX!' ART£ 
DOCnl'l:: NOTICEOfEXPARTE 
AI'PL: Gooal< &.:. 
ATT:£AduooJ-. 
LAWFIR.\1: .l.amput.<ro>aooi A lolmsloo,J.C. 
DOC n'PE: 01liEit . 
APPL: ACS.rr- • 
-~. ·--~-
PROCEillL'IG: 116-98 
On the other hand, the same risk for sub rosa influence is 
evident. First, as discussed below, agencies do not have an 
incentive to be completely transparent, and even the FCC, as we 
will discuss below, renders its ex parte disclosures opaque in 
60. How to Comment, FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N 1-2, http://transition.fcc.gov/cgbl 
consumerfacts/howtocomment.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
61. 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1200-1.1216 (2012). 
62. See, e.g., Letter from Ari Fitzgerald, Counsel to the Alliance of Auto. Mfrs. & 
Ass'n of Global Automakers, to Marlene Dortch, Sec'y, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n (Sept. 13, 
2013) [hereinafter Fitzgerald Letter], available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/documentlview? 
id=7520943443 (disclosing a meeting of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers and the 
Association of Global Automakers with David Goldman, · Legal Advisor to Federal 
Communications Commissioner Rosenworcel). 
63. See id. (reporting an ex parte communication two days after it occurred); see 
also How to Comment, supra note 60 (noting that filings may be both made and viewed 
electronically). 
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certain ways.64 As Figure 1 above shows, the metadata does not 
make clear with which of the five FCC commissioners a party has 
met.65 Second, agencies that wish to be influenced in a sub rosa 
way could easily be so.66 However, the advantage of ex parte 
disclosure-combined with a computerized database-is that 
with minimal analysis one can detect patterns of influence. Few 
parties are so powerful that they can abandon completely normal 
channels of lobbying, even if in the end, they rely on more secret 
efforts. Thus, the patterns of influence should be decipherable 
and rendered clear in "real time," particularly through "big data" 
analysis, as the final Part discusses. 67 
III. TRANSPARENCY AND PHYSICAL PLACE 
Information is not transparent if it is not easily physically 
available, as the anecdote in Part I demonstrates.68 Congress 
ceased to be transparent about its financial trading when its 
STOCK Act disclosures became available only on paper and in 
the basement of the Cannon Office Building.69 As a good example 
of the need of physical availability for government transparency, 
consider the Federal Depository Library Program (FDLP), 
established by Congress in the early nineteenth century when 
communication was difficult and expensive, which "ensure[s] that 
the American public has access to its Government's 
information."70 Participating libraries receive free government 
documents (statutes, regulations, reports, etc.) from the 
Government Printing Office in exchange for making these 
materials available. 71 The FDLP endeavored to bring government 
information to as many geographic locations as possible; it does 
the opposite of what the amendments to the STOCK Act did.72 Of 
64. See Amendment of the Commission's Ex Parte Rules and Other Procedural 
Rules, 26 FCC Red. 4517, 4521 (2011); infra Part V (discussing reasons why politicians 
lack incentives to be transparent). 
65. See supra Figure 1. "The FCC is directed by five commissioners appointed by 
the president of the United States and confirmed by the U.S. Senate for five-year terms, 
except when filling an unexpired term." FCC Leadership, FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, 
http://www.fcc.gov/leadership (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
66. Fiorini, supra note 4, at 6--7. 
67. See infra Part VII. 
68. See supra Part I (discussing the availability of information in relation to the 
transparency of hypothetical Mr. Jones's personal identifying information). 
69. Keith, supra note 10. 
70. About the FDLP, FDLP DESKTOP, http://fdlp.gov/home/about (last visited Nov. 
17, 2013). 
71. Id. 
72. See Act of Apr. 15, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-7, 127 Stat. 438 (2013) (rendering 
ineffective sections 8(a) and 11(a) of the STOCK Act); Federal Depository Library 
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course, the FDLP seems largely archaic in light of the Internet 
which has essentially eliminated physical place as a barrier to 
transparency. If you can get online anywhere in the world, you 
have potential access to all the information in the world-
provided that the information is online. 
Law and regulation have long recognized the power of place 
to reduce transparency-sometimes for good reason. As an 
excellent example, consider the Privacy Act of 197 4. 73 Even in 
197 4, many within and outside of govemment realized how 
computerization would render information, once kept safe in 
filing cabinets and warehouses, effortlessly available to countless 
government workers.74 Congress passed the Privacy Act of 1974 
"in response to concerns about how the creation and use of 
computerized databases might impact individuals' privacy 
rights.''75 
The Privacy Act places barriers "on how agencies can share 
an individual's data with other people and agencies."76 In other 
words, simply because the Department of Health and Human 
Services has some information, an employee in the Commerce 
Department should not have access to it-let alone a member of 
the public. 77 By creating legal walls around information, the 
Privacy Act cordons off information into the various government 
departments and agencies, placing physical limits on where 
information flows. 78 
Outside agencies, the Fourth Amendment privacy 
protections can be seen as precisely this sort of transparency 
reduction. The Fourth Amendment requires that, under most 
circumstances, the government must acquire a warrant to 
obtain information.79 Like the Privacy Act, the Fourth 
Program, U.S. Gov'T PRINTING OFFICE, http://www.gpo.gov/libraries/ (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2013); see also supra text accompanying notes 24-27. 
73. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012). 
74. The Act was passed, in part, in response to the report from the Department 
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) outlining the risks of the emerging large 
computerized databases. See SEC'Y'S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA 
SYS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE 
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973); see also The Privacy Act of 1974, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. 
CENT., http://epic.org/privacy/1974acU (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (contemplating 
potential abuse of compiled personal data that had become readily available). 
75. The Privacy Act of 1974, supra note 74. 
76. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b); The Privacy Act of 1974, supra note 74. 
77. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)-(f). 
78. Id. § 552a(b). 
79. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (requiring a warrant and probable cause before 
overcoming a person's right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects"). 
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Amendment creates barriers around certain physical places to 
reduce the flow of information and decrease transparency.80 
The Kyllo case is a good example. 81 It involved the use of 
infrared heat sensors to obtain information about heat usage 
inside a building-a very convenient police technology for 
detecting indoor marijuana farms that use grow lamps.82 
However, in the words of Justice Scalia, "[t]he Agema 
Thermovision 210 [the infrared scanner] might disclose, for 
example, at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her 
daily sauna and bath-a detail that many would consider 
'intimate.'"83 In finding such heat detectors to be an unreasonable 
search without a warrant under the Fourth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court created a physical barrier keeping information, 
at least that information communicable via infrared radiation, 
within buildings' interior.84 Again, law creates a physical barrier 
for the flow of information. 
Viewing transparency in terms of reducing the cost of 
information has important implications for privacy law. In a 
sense, privacy law is the mirror image of transparency. The 
former increases the cost of obtaining information, the latter 
decreases its costs.85 Identifying the parameters of this cost is the 
central question of both regulatory concerns.86 The previous Part 
discussed the cost of providing real-time data, this Part discussed 
the cost of providing actual physical access, and the subsequent 
Part will discuss what this Article terms "computational 
transparency."87 
IV. COMPUTATIONAL OR INFORMATION COMPLEXITY AND 
TRANSPARENCY 
An old movie, The Seven-Per-Cent Solution, has as its 
motivating conceit a plan by which Dr. Watson tricks Sherlock 
Holmes, played by Nicol Williamson, to journey to Vienna to cure 
80. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (placing a barrier around the physical place of 
infonnation, as well as how agencies can share such infonnation), with U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV (creating a barrier around a person's home, a physical place, and thus reducing 
the flow of infonnation). 
81. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
82. !d. at 29. 
83. !d. at 38. 
84. ld. at 40. 
85. Lindstedt & Naurin, supra note 2, at 304; Ohm, supra note 7, at 1736, 1741, 
1756. 
86. Lindstedt & Naurin, supra note 2, at 30~4; Schwartz & Solove, supra note 7, 
at 1865-66. 
87. See supra Parts II, III; infra Part IV. 
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his cocaine addiction.88 Watson plans for Holmes to be treated by 
the then-largely-unknown physician, Sigmund Freud, played by 
Alan Arkin.89 When Holmes finally arrives in Vienna and 
confronts Freud about the ruse, the founder of psychoanalysis 
responds, "Who am I that your friends should wish us to meet?',go 
Freud intends this question to elicit from Holmes reflection upon 
his drug addiction and need for medical treatment.91 
The question did not have its intended effect. After 
"observing" the famous flat at Berggasse 19 for only a few 
moments, Holmes does not engage in reflection about his 
addiction but rather directly responds to Freud's question.92 
"Beyond the fact that you are a brilliant Jewish physician," 
Holmes answers, "who was born in Hungary and studied for a 
while in Paris and that certain radical theories of yours have 
alienated the respectable medical community so that you have 
severed your connection with various hospitals and branches of 
the medical fraternity. Beyond this I can deduce little. You are 
married with a child of five. You enjoy Shakespeare and possess 
a sense ofhonor."93 
Amazed, Freud asks how Holmes could "guess" these facts 
from a brief inspection ofhis study.94 
"I never guess. It is an appalling habit, destructive to the 
logical faculty," snaps Holmes.95 He then explains how the little 
details of Freud's study-from the selection and placement of 
books, the patterns of dust accumulation, the spaces on the walls 
where certificates, awards, and diplomas were once hung, his 
accent, his wedding ring, and the toy soldier on the rug-disclose 
all these facts, making them transparent, at least to Holmes.96 
For our purposes, this scene presents a central question 
about transparency. Was Freud's flat at Berggasse 19 
"transparent" as to all of these facts about Freud? And, the 
answer is yes-if you're Sherlock Holmes. He possesses, as he 
admits, powers of "deduction"-or, as we might say, 
computation-that allow him to infer important facts from those 
88. THE SEVEN-PER-CENT SOLUTION (Universal Pictures 1976). 
89. ld. 
90. Id. at 28:03. 
91. See id. 
92. Id. at 28:07. 
93. Id. 
94. I d. at 28:31. 
95. I d. at 28:38. 
96. I d. at 28:43. 
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most would not notice.97 Computational transparency, therefore, 
allows individuals who have less computing power between their 
ears than Holmes, i.e., the rest of us, to deduce the facts we want 
from those that are given to us.98 
The rise of the Internet, big data, and cheap computation 
has transformed questions about computational transparency.99 
Again, privacy law is illustrative. The existence of easily 
accessible databases allows more people to derive more facts from 
less data.100 Many are concerned about the easy electronic 
availability of medical records.101 Epidemiological data is, of 
course, very valuable for medical research, allowing scientists to 
examine the impact of treatment on populations.102 Part of the 
promise of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PP ACA) and universal electronic records is that enormous 
amounts of data will facilitate these types of investigations.103 
Say you wish to examine the effect of smoking cessation 
programs. You obtain healthcare records in which every 
individual is identified by birth date, sex, and ZIP code. These 
are important bits of data as they allow you to control for age, 
sex, and approximate socio-economic level.104 These data seem 
anonymous-but they are not. As many have argued, these three 
bits of data are personally identifying, i.e., there may be only one 
person, or at most a handful, with a particular sex and birth date 
within most ZIP codes.105 And given easily obtainable information 
on the Internet, you do not have to be Sherlock Holmes to 
complete the deduction. 
Thus, transparency should aim to be "computationally 
transparent," or to use another phrase, present uncomplex 
information. As argued in Part I, this question has inevitable 
normative components. Information is only complex--or 
uncomplex-relative to the questions one wants answered. In 
other words, Holmes no doubt could have deduced a huge 
number of facts from the flat on Berggasse 19-from where the 
family bought its torten to his wife's preferences in wall paper-
97. See id. 
98. See Sweeney, supra note 9, at 2 (demonstrating how it is possible to deduce a 
person's identity from publicly available information). 
99. Wu, supra note 5, at 1120, 1122, 1153, 1157. 
100. See Sweeney, supra note 9, at 16, 28. 
101. Wu, supra note 5, at 1156-57. 
102. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 7, at 1866. 
103. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 740 
(2010); Schwartz & Solove, supra note 7, at 1866-67. 
104. See Sweeney, supra note 9, at 2, 16, 28. 
105. Id. at 5; Wu, supra note 5, at 1119-20. 
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but he was interested in one thing: who was this man that Dr. 
Watson tricked me to visit?106 Thus, computational transparency 
is always relative to a particular question.107 
But, which question is relevant in govemment 
transparency? This question is fairly simple, or so this Article 
argues. Government transparency is about revealing influence in 
order to limit corruption and provide, as this Article argues, 
information about the best timing for rewarding or threatening 
decision-makers.108 Data should be disclosed in ways that makes 
information about influence easier to obtain. 
While simple in theory, this question can be quite difficult. 
And, indeed, much depends upon details. Consider two examples. 
The Federal Communications Commission's ECFS system, as 
discussed above, provides information about ex parte meetings.109 
From a perspective of influence, one would want to see which 
parties were meeting with which commissioners. This 
information is revealed in the text of the letter that parties must 
submit which, in turn, is made available in PDF form on the 
Internet. 110 However, the information is not contained in 
metadata of the computer file of the letter.m Thus, if you want to 
find out who is meeting whom, you must extract the information 
from the PDF. The extraction is an extra computational step, 
easy to do one time, but quite time consuming if one wishes to 
detect pattems of influence over time. 
Similarly, consider the efforts of Daniel Katz, Michael 
Bommarito, and Jonathan Zeiner to analyze whether the Cash 
for Clunkers program favored particular congressional 
districts.112 The information on where payments were made was 
categorized by ZIP code. 113 The researchers were motivated to 
discover differences in the payments received among 
congressional districts and other geographical and political units. 
106. See THE SEVEN-PER-CENT SOLUTION, supra note 88. 
107. Wu, supra note 5, at 1157. 
108. See Lindstedt & Naurin, supra note 2, at 302, 306; supra Part I. 
109. See Electronic Comment Filing System, supra note 59 and accompanying text; 
supra text accompanying notes 60-63; supra Figure 1. 
110. See Amendment of the Commission's Ex Parte Rules and Other Procedural 
Rules, 26 FCC Red. 4517, 4547 (2011) (requiring that ex parte presentations and all 
attachments be filed in a "native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf)"); 
Fitzgerald Letter, supra note 62. 
111. See Electronic Comment Filing System Search Results, FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, 
http://www.fcc.gov/search/resultslecfs/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
112. Daniel Martin Katz, Michael Bommarito & Jonathan Zeiner, Cash for Clunkers, 
COMPUTATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES (Dec. 9, 2009), http://computationallegalstudies.com/ 
2009/12/09/cash-for-clunkers-visualization-and-analysis/. 
113. See id. 
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This relationship required connecting ZIP codes to congressional 
districts and census data. 
This connection is difficult to make. ZIP codes, interestingly 
enough, are protected intellectual property owned by the U.S. 
Post Office.114 They are subject to change and often cross state 
and local boundaries. They bear little relationship to political 
boundaries-or census track-as overlay maps indicate.115 
On the other hand, congressional districting is largely a 
province of state governments, which use census data to 
construct district boundaries. 116 The U.S. Census Bureau does 
not collect data using ZIP code maps. 117 While it does collect 
data using ZIP Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs) that are built 
from census blocks, ZCTA's do not perfectly track ZIP code 
areas.
118 While certain tools exist that can translate between 
ZIP code and congressional district, they are often 
incomplete. 119 For instance; ZCTAs, which only track populated 
areas, do not include post office-specific ZIP codes. 120 
Government data that categorizes by ZIP code is not as 
transparent as one might think because it is computationally 
difficult to "translate" ZIP codes into other geographical and 
political boundaries. In· this way, tracking government 
behavior becomes more difficult, and transparency is 
diminished. 
114. See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012) ("Copyright protection under this title is not 
available for any work of the United States Government, but the United States 
Government is not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by 
assignment, bequest, or otherwise."). But see COMPENDIUM II: COMPENDIUM OF 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 206.02(b) (1984) ("Works of the U.S. Postal Service, as 
now constituted, are not considered U.S. Government works."). The Post Office publishes 
a yearly book demarcating ZIP code boundaries and claims copyright protection for these 
mappings. U.S. POSTAL SERV., AIS VIEWER USER'S GUIDE (2013), available at 
https://ribbs. usps.gov/addressing/documents/tech_guides/pubs/ AIS_ VIEWER_ USER.PDF. 
115. See ZIP Code Demographics by Congressional District, PROXIMITY, 
http://proximityone.com/zip-cd.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
116. Professor Justin Levitt of Loyola Law School, Los Angeles writes a web resource 
that explains the process. See Justin Levitt, All About Redistricting, 
http://redistricting.lls.edu/who.php (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
117. See Geography, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/ 
zctas.html (last updated June 20, 2013). 
118. See id. ("In most instances the ZCTA code is the same as the ZIP Code for an 
area."). 
119. Find Your Representative, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
http://www.house.gov/htbin/findrep? (last visited Nov. 17, 2013); ZIP Code Demographics 
by Congressional District, PROXIMITY, http://proximityone.com/zip-cd.htm#details (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
120. Glossary, PROXIMITY, http://proximityone.com/glossary.htm#zip_code_tabulation 
_area_zcta (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) ("ZCTAs do not precisely depict the area within 
which mail deliveries associated with that ZIP Code occur."). 
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Computational transparency is relative to what you want to 
be transparent. In government transparency, the argument is, of 
course, influence. This goal must be analyzed in light of 
deduction resources available, i.e., ZIP codes and congressional 
district maps as with the Bommarito and Katz efforts, automated 
PDF readers as with the FCC, or perhaps Sherlock Holmes, if he 
is available. Only a careful statement of what is to be revealed-
and an understanding of the computational steps necessary to 
reveal it--can lead to true transparency. 
V. TRANSPARENCY'S INCENTIVES 
Few in government have long-term incentives to be 
transparent about their work.121 While some politicians support 
transparency efforts--or how else would the Freedom of 
Information Act or the Sunshine Act ever be passed?-politicians 
lack incentives to maintain these transparency efforts over 
time.122 Secrecy in government allows politicians and bureaucrats 
to make deals without public accountability-thereby 
maximizing financial and/or political support by taking positions 
or allying themselves with groups to which their electorate might 
object. 123 Minimal transparency allows politicians to have their 
cake and eat it, too.124 
The fact that politicians have few incentives to create and 
maintain transparency has several legal and policy implications. 
First, when transparency regimes are created-under some 
public pressure or gaze-careful attention must be paid to the 
form of transparency. It must reduce the cost of obtaining 
information in real time and in physical form. Further, in the 
administrative context, it must be computationally transparent 
to issues of interest, namely political influence. 
One way to counter the tendency to let transparency be lost 
in the details is to standardize disclosure. Such a prototype has 
121. Fiorini, supra note 4, at 6 (explaining why government officials have incentives 
to keep infonnation secret, thereby lacking incentives to be transparent over time). 
122. Id.; see also Freedom of Infonnation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012) (showing 
politicians' support for transparency efforts by requiring agencies to make infonnation 
available to the public); Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (showing 
politicians' support for transparency efforts by requiring open meetings). 
123. See Fiorini, supra note 4, at 6-7. 
124. Steven J. Mulroy, Sunlight's Glare: How Overboard Open Government Laws 
Chill Free Speech and Hamper Effective Democracy, 78 TENN. L. REv. 309, 360-62 (2011); 
Kenneth Corbin, The Toxic Effect of the Sunshine Act, INTERNET NEWS (Jan. 6, 2009), 
http://www.internetnews.com/kcorbin/2009/0llthe-toxic-effect-of-the-sunshi.html (showing 
how the Sunshine Act allows for minimal or token transparency by technically complying 
with the letter of the law but not with the spirit of the law). 
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been envisioned by the Obama administration.125 Cass Sunstein, 
in his capacity as Administrator of the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs, issued a memorandum, pressing agencies to 
provide information "in an open format that enables the public to 
download, analyze, and visualize any information and data."126 
But, as this Article argues, the devil is in the details. 
Transparent government requires at a minimum that data be 
released in an easily searchable format, like XML.127 It requires 
computational transparency: the careful analysis of what 
information is important and relevant to disclosing influence. 
Second, there is the problem of "dynamic" reaction to 
disclosure requirements. The transparency of congressional 
proceedings offers a striking illustration of this phenomenon. 
Originally, Congress met in secret, as did the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787.128 While Congress opened some of its 
meetings to the public early on, it was not until 1929 that 
Congress opened nomination, confirmation, and treaty 
deliberations.129 However, as congressional proceedings became 
more public, important legislative activity moved to the Senate 
and House committees, which were private until opened to the 
public in 1970.130 
Once the committees became more important (and public), 
Congress got its work done elsewhere. "[W]hile congressional 
debates and committee meetings are open to the public, there is 
no legal restriction on members of Congress conferring in private 
to hold substantive discussions on public business. Indeed, the 
practice is quite frequent."131 Thus, as Congress became more 
transparent with respect to its proceedings and its committee 
meetings, it began to rely more on its caucus meetings, which 
remained secret.132 In other words, even as public pressure opens 
certain aspects of government proceedings, government has the 
power to control its proceedings to maintain secrecy. 
125. Transparency and Open Government: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
126. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies from Cass 
Sunstein, Adm'r, Office of Mgmt. & Budget 1 (Apr. 25, 2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/omblmemoranda/2011/m11-25.pdf. 
127. W.M.P. van der Aalst & A.khil Kumar, XML-Based Schema Definition for 
Support of lnterorganizational Workflow, 141NFO. SYS. RESEARCH 23, 26 (2003). 
128. Mulroy, supra note 124, at 326. 
129. CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42106, SECRET SESSIONS OF 
THE HOUSE AND SENATE: AUTHORITY, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND FREQUENCY (2013). 
130. Mulroy, supra note 124, at 326. 
131. ld. 
132. I d. at 322, 326, 343. 
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This principle applies with less force to administrative 
agencies. On one hand, agencies do not have complete latitude in 
writing their rules of procedure; on the other hand, they often 
enjoy enough latitude to evade requirements.133 For instance, the 
1976 Sunshine Ace34 requires that every "meeting'' of a federal 
agency be held in public, pursuant to notice.135 This requirement 
has often led to criticism, particularly from members of multi-
person commissions or boards.136 The Sunshine Act forbids them 
from meeting as a deliberative body, except in public.137 
Commissioners often argue that this requirement limits their 
ability to make collegial decisions and limits their flexibility to 
compromise.138 
On the other hand, this criticism may be somewhat 
exaggerated. At the FCC, each commissioner has a staff of legal 
advisors who meet weekly and negotiate outcomes at their 
bosses' request.139 These meetings, like congressional caucuses, 
are secret-and that is where most of the horse-trading is done.140 
133. Fenster, supra note 12, at 619, 629, 637, 640-41; David A. Barrett, Note, 
Facilitating Government Decision Making: Distinguishing Between Meetings and 
Nonmeetings Under the Federal Sunshine Act, 66 TEx. L. REv. 1195, 1207-10 (1988). 
134. Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2012). 
135. ld. §§ 552b(b), (e). 
136. Fenster, supra note 12, at 639-41; Barrett, supra note 133, at 1208-11; Kenneth 
Corbin, The Toxic Effect of the Sunshine Act, INTERNET NEWS, (Jan. 6, 2009), 
http://www .intemetnews.com/kcorbin/2009/0 1/the-toxic-effect-of-the-sunshi.html ("The 
Sunshine Act prohibits a mejority of commissioners (there are five) from meeting to 
conduct official FCC business while behind closed doors. As a result, the commission 
roughly once a month holds an open meeting, where members of the public and press can 
watch as the commissioners read prepared statements and cast votes on the items on the 
agenda .... But to critics, the problem is that the Sunshine Act has had the unintended 
consequence of bleeding the debate and honest dialogue out of the commission's 
consideration of the issues. Paradoxically, it has made the FCC a more secretive place. 
'The Sunshine Act is one of the biggest barriers to dialogue among the commissioners,' 
Kathleen Abernathy, a former commissioner, recently said at a seminar in Washington on 
reforming the FCC .... [She] lamented the effect of prohibiting the commissioners from 
collaborating on the various draft proposals to arrive at some meeting of the minds ahead 
of the open meetings."). 
137. 5 U.S.C. § 552b; Corbin, supra note 136. 
138. Corbin, supra note 136; see Letter from Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Fed. 
Commc'ns Comm'n, & Michael J. Copps, Comm'nr, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, to Hon. Ted 
Stevens, Chairman, S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp. 1-2 (Feb. 2, 2005), available 
at http://www .freestatefoundation.org/images/Powell_ Copps_Joint_Letter. pdf. 
139. U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GA0-10-79, FCC MANAGEMENT: 
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN COMMUNICATION, DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES, AND 
WORKFORCE PLANNING 15--17 (2009); Paul Kirby, Ted Gotsch & Lynn Stanton, As Martin 
Touts Achievements, Copps Seeks to Fix FCC Faults on Communication, Openness, 
TELECOMM. REP., Feb. 1, 2009, at 1, 35. 
140. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME 
L. REv. 1441, 1448 (2008) ("[H]urdles for major legislation are reduced through informal 
cooperation among legislators who agree not to block most measures they oppose and 
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Congress could eliminate, or at least decrease, such meetings by 
forbidding commissioners from having such staffs-but it, of 
course, has limited power to flush out all secrecy. 
This analysis suggests two issues: whether transparency in 
the administrative context is valuable at all and where its limits 
lie. The following sections examine these issues in turi?-. 
VI. THE CASE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE TRANSPARENCY 
The case for transparency in agency deliberations inevitably 
assumes an ideological cast, as it turns on the role agencies 
should play. On one hand, if one likes the administrative state, 
one tends to have less support for transparency.141 Congress can 
legitimately delegate to agencies the authority to make law 
through regulation. As lawmakers, agencies must engage in deal-
making-and that is okay. Transparency can chill discussion 
and, therefore, decrease collegial decision-making and thwart 
compromise.142 On the other hand, if one harbors suspicions of the 
administrative state, then one would welcome transparency's 
stymying of agency deal-making.148 Agencies should simply 
enforce the law in a manner as faithful to congressional 
mandates as possible. 
The anti-transparency position needs a bit more unpacking. 
Why does transparency limit discussion? In legislatures, secrecy 
allows individuals to make certain comments or take positions 
that would offend members of their electorate. This freedom, as 
many legal scholars maintain, leads to compromise and efficient 
decision-making. Indeed, most legal scholars believe that is the 
through deals worked out by congressional, executive, and/or party officials through 
legislator-executive 'summits,' as well as legislative caucuses or conference committees." 
(citing JOHN B. GILMOUR, STRATEGIC DISAGREEMENT: STALEMATE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
132-64 (1995))). 
141. See, e.g., Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REv. 885, 900-
02, 921-30 (2006) ("[E]fforts to stop bureaucratic secrecy or to impose disclosure 
requirements to mitigate it run counter to the necessary and inevitable dynamics of the 
bureaucratic state, as well as its resistance to change."); Scott M. Lassman, Transparency 
and Innuendo: An Alternative to Reactive Over-Disclosure, 69 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Summer 2006, at 69, 73 (cautioning, in regard to the FDA, that "[a]lthough transparency 
should be vigorously pursued as a public policy objective, it must be balanced against 
other important public policy objectives"). 
142. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Scaling Up Deliberative Democracy as Dispute 
Resolution in Healthcare Reform: A Work in Progress, 74 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Summer 2011, at 1, 21; Corbin, supra, note 136. 
143. See Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability: Open 
Government in the United States, 31 YALE L. & POL 'y REv. 79, 83 (2012) ("Throughout 
American history, it has been well understood that '[d]emocracies die behind closed doors,' 
and that 'to be held accountable and to perform well, [government] must be visible to the 
public.'" (alterations in original) (quoting Fenster, supra note 12, at 619)). 
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case.144 Those who have faith in such deliberation, like the civic 
republicans, would wish to encourage it and, therefore, look 
askance at transparency. 145 Those who view the democratic 
process as simply the interplay of special interests, like the 
public choice theorists, would likely support greater transparency 
as a tool to limit lawmakers' rent extraction.146 
In the administrative context, those who support the 
administrative state would see agencies as engaged in legitimate 
lawmaking, and therefore, transparency would not be an unalloyed 
good.147 Agencies must have full freedom to negotiate, compromise, 
and deliberate. 
There is, however, a difference between legislatures and 
agencies. Legislatures must compromise competing sets of political 
interests. If they get the compromise wrong, the electorate kicks 
them out.148 Arguably, they have the incentive to make compromises 
that advance the greatest good for the greatest number.149 
On the other hand, bureaucratic incentives are much more 
obscure. Often operating far removed from the public gaze, 
bureaucrats with civil service protection operate under very 
different incentive structures than politicians. 150 Their deals often 
144. See, e.g., Fenster, supra note 141, at 908 ("Transparency also harms government 
decisionmaking by adversely affecting the ability of government officials to deliberate over 
policy matters outside of the public eye .... "); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 142, at 21 ("In 
some theoretical models of disputing, [secrecy] would be a good thing-many different 
interests could be used to trade and bargain across differently valued preferences on 
different issues, and trades and bargains could be made. But as this issue developed in a 
partisan political environment and in a very public forum (in contrast to Hillary Clinton's 
initial desire to keep the healthcare-reform process more private, which Elster suggested 
was a good thing in the American constitutional-formation process), it became 
particularly difficult to make 'trades' across class, interest, and role (professional and 
political) lines." (footnotes omitted)); Barrett, supra note 133, at 1208-11 (elucidating 
the argument against government transparency). 
145. See Barrett, supra note 133, at 1208-11. 
146. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE 
L. J. 65, 106 (1983); Fenster, supra note 141, at 928. 
147. See Fenster, supra note 141, at 902-10. 
148. See, e.g., MichaelS. Kang, Sore Loser Laws and Democratic Contestation, 99 
GEO. L.J. 1013, 1050-51 (2011) (chronicling how Senator Joe Lieberman lost the 
Democratic Party primary in 2006 after vocally supporting President George W. Bush 
and the Iraq War); Phil Tenser, State Senators John Morse and Angela Giron 
Recalled in Historic Elections, THEDENVERCHANNEL.COM (Sept. 10, 2013), 
http://www. thedenverchannel.com/news/poli tics/polls-open -for-colorados-first-ever-
recall-elections-at-7-am (demonstrating that the electorate will remove legislators 
from office when they do not agree with their actions). 
149. See Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice and Legal Scholarship, 46 J. LEGAL 
Enuc. 490, 491-93 (1996) (describing how elected officials will choose positions and 
make compromises "in order to maximize their chance of reelection"). 
150. Compare id. at 491-95 (describing how politicians' main motivation is 
reelection), with John Nichols, FCC Rejects Public Interest, NATION (June 2, 2003), 
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will maximize their own job security or even the chance for 
employment with the entities they regulate.151 Similarly, political 
appointees who run these agencies often have incentives to serve 
their own short-term political advancement, not the public 
good.152 Thus, by using secrecy against their political sponsors, 
bureaucratic deal-making undermines legislative compromises, 
which possess some incentive to maximize the greatest good for the 
greatest number.153 Thus, capture, though it plays a role with 
legislatures, seems more prevalent and more dangerous in 
agencies.154 While it is, of course, an ideological debate as to which 
one of these incentive structures predominates, it is hard to argue 
that the bureaucracy has less of an incentive to obtain compromises 
and deals that offer the greatest good for the greatest many. 
In sum, this Article suggests that the heightened possibility of 
special interest capture strengthens the need for transparency in 
agencies. Or, to put the matter another way, agency capture should 
be a game that should be as open and democratic as possible to give 
the greatest number and diversity of parties an opportunity to win. 
As argued above, easy physical access and real-time transparency 
can contribute to this goal, as such transparency lowers the cost of 
democratizing the process of pressuring decision-makers. 
VII. E-ECTOPANOPTICA AND BIG DATA 
Mark Fenster first proposed the notion of the inverted 
Panopticon and applied it to government transparency.155 He 
borrows the notion from Jeremy Bentham--elaborated in the 
http://www.thenation.com/bloglfcc-rejects-public-interest# (suggesting that bureaucrats 
are incentivized to act in favor of industries and corporations that bribe them with "first-
class flights, luxury hotel suites and other favors that the [corporations use] to influence 
the decision-making process"). 
151. See N. Adam Dietrich II, BP's Deepwater Horizon: "The Goldman Sachs of the 
Sea", 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 315, 333-34 (2012) (discussing how Mineral 
Management Service officials would favor the oil and gas industry "if they expected 
rewards in the form of future employment"); Nichols, supra note 150 (discussing the 
"incestuous relationships between regulators and the industries they are supposed to 
regulate"). 
152. See Dietrich, supra note 151, at 333-34; Nichols, supra note 150. 
153. Rubin, supra note 149, at 492 (noting that legislative compromise may result 
from the mininmm winning coalition, which results in agreements benefitting a greater 
number of constituents). 
154. Paul Rose & Christopher J. Walker, Dodd-Frank Regulators, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, and Agency Capture, 66 STAN. L. REv. ONLINE 9, 14-15 (2013); Tom Udall, 
Amend the Constitution to Restore Public Trust in the Political System: A Practitioner's 
Perspective on Campaign Finance Reform, 29 YALE L. & POL 'y REV. 235, 240 (2010) 
(describing that legislature capture occurs "when elected officials are responsive to special 
interests to the exclusion, or detriment, of their own constituents"). 
155. Fenster, supra note 12, at 668--69. 
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works of post-structuralist theorist Michel Foucault.156 Bentham 
envisioned the Panopticon as a penitentiary, in which the jailors 
could constantly watch inmates through a wheel-and-spoke 
prison architecture.157 The inmates' cells were placed on the 
periphery, with the prison guard watching from the center.158 
Foucault applied the idea to the state watching its citizens in his 
best seller of French post-structuralism, Discipline and Punish. 159 
Applying this idea of government, Fenster inverts the 
Panopticon so that under what he terms the "metaphor" of 
transparency, the citizens watch the state: 
In all of its guises, the transparency metaphor urges the 
construction of an inverted panoptic penal facility, one that 
puts the public-or some subset thereof-in the position of 
the guard and that casts government officials as the 
incarcerated. Jeremy Bentham's original design for his 
Panopticon arranged and illuminated cells so that the 
inmates would be constantly visible to prison guards 
located securely in a central tower. Prisoners could see the 
tower but could not see into it, and could constantly be 
seen, despite being confined to a cell from which they could 
not escape .... The Panorticon thus makes its subjects 
transparent to authority. 16 
Fenster rejects this perfect notion of transparency due to the 
complexity of agency action, concluding 
because the state cannot be made wholly visible, short of 
dismantling it or imposing a maddening (and likely 
impossible to construct) panoptic apparatus, such a desire 
will lead only to cycles of frustration .... Second, the will to 
see the state is so much a part of American democratic, 
populist political culture that is skeptical of the state that it 
cannot itselfbe wished away.161 
This Article questions that conclusion at least in the 
administrative context-returning to the notion of the 
Panopticon and, in particular, its relationship to electronic 
data. Coining the term "E-Ectopanopticon" (the outside all 
seeing), this Article argues that big data and decentralized 
data processing can in fact render the government 
decipherable in key ways and, indeed, seems necessary given 
156. Id. 
157. ld. 
lo58. ld. 
159. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PuNISH: THE BmTH OF THE PRISON 195-201 
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1979) (1977). 
160. Fenster, supra note 12, at 657, 66~9 (footnote omitted). 
161. ld. at 671-72. 
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the increased government electronic surveillance of its 
citizens. 
Returning once again to privacy law, it is conventionally-
and quite reasonably-held that the government, by leveraging 
the shift in human affairs to cyberspace, has greatly increased its 
ability to monitor citizen activity.162 Often without a formal 
search warrant, the government can legally monitor and read 
e-mail activity, Facebook accounts, financial records, geo-location 
data from cellphones, and Internet Service Provider (ISP) 
account records and log files, showing all Internet sites visited.163 
Thus, communications that, in pre-Internet days, had been 
conducted via U.S. mail, in person, or by telephone-all of which 
require warrants to discover their content-has shifted to the 
Internet, which is more easily accessible by law enforcement and 
other arms of the government. Indeed, the recent scandals of the 
PRISM project simply reinforced what everybody knows.164 
At the same time, computerization has made records more 
easily discoverable, such as credit card purchasing history, credit 
history, mortgage payments, electronic highway toll activity-let 
alone social media, such as blogs, Twitter, and Facebook.165 
Widespread use of cameras particularly in urban areas-and, no 
doubt in the future, drones-to read faces and license plates, 
provide easily accessible, complete electronic records of citizens' 
movements.166 Information that would have taken months to 
162. See Foreign Intelligence Service Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012); Press 
Release, Office of the Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, Facts on the Collection of Intelligence 
Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1-3 (June 8, 2013), 
available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Facts%20on%20the%20Collection%20of% 
20Intelligence%20Pursuant%20to%20Section%20702.pdf; Brian Barrett, What Is 
PRISM?, GIZMODO.COM (Jun. 7, 2013), http:l/gizmodo.com/what-is-prism-511875267. 
163. Emily Flitter, Stella Dawson & Mark Hosenball, Exclusive-U.S. to Let Spy 
Agencies Scour Americans' Finances, REUTERS " (Mar. 13, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/13/usa-banks-spying-idiNDEE92COEH20130313; 
Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects 'Nearly Everything a User Does on the 
Internet', GUARDIAN, (July 31, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-
top-secret-program-online-data; NSA Slides Explain the PRISM Data-Collection Program, 
WASH. POST (Jun. 6, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/speciallpolitics/prism-
collection-documents/; Dominic Rushe & James Ball, PRISM Scandal: Tech Giants Flatly 
Deny Allowing NSA Direct Access to Servers, GUARDIAN (Jun. 6, 2013), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/07/prism-tech-giants-shock-nsa-data-mining. 
164. See Barrett, supra note 162; NSA Slides Explain the PRISM Data-Collection 
Program, supra note 163; Rushe & Ball, supra note 163. 
165. See Jon D. Michaels, All the President's Spies: Private-Public Intelligence 
Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 CAL. L. REv. 901, 902--08 (2008) (discussing how 
electronic personal and business transactions have "generated an unprecedented number 
of data points about individuals"). 
166. Dan Farmer & Charles C. Mann, Surveillance Nation, 106 TECH. REV., Apr. 
2003, at 34, 36-40. 
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obtain from paper documents is now available with a few 
computer clicks. Even without search warrants, the government 
can simply buy most of this information from third-party vendors 
who collect it for market researching purposes.167 
To the degree, therefore, that the governed should have 
information parity with their government, transparency should 
keep pace with surveillance. Further, just as electronic 
computerized records make surveillance easier, they also can 
improve transparency.168 Return to the example of the Federal 
Communications Commission. While not immediately apparent 
from the ECFS, it is possible to construct from the ex parte data 
a detailed analysis of where the commissioners got their 
information and to whom they were speaking.169 As argued above, 
the continued standardization of data formats will only 
encourage the better tracking of government actors .170 
This Article ends with a radical vision, the E-
Ectopanopticon. "Radical," which comes from the Latin for "root," 
denotes an idea that is not only at odds with current thinking but 
returns to older ideas.171 Here, we consider the Rector's Palace in 
fourteenth century Dubrovnik.172 The Croatian city of Dubrovnik, 
during much of the Middle Ages and late Renaissance, rivaled 
Venice in control of the trade routes of the Eastern 
Mediterranean.173 Ruled by an oligarchy of commercial families, 
the city had a figurehead rule, the Rector. 174 To guard against his 
seizing real power, the law limited his term to one month during 
which time he had to live in the Rector's Palace, a lovely building 
167. See Michaels, supra note 165 (describing how the government gets "unparalleled 
access to the American public's intimate affairs" from corporations). 
168. See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies and 
Independent Agencies from Jeffrey D. Zients, Acting Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, and 
David S. Ferriero, Archivist, Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. 1-3, 5 (Aug. 24, 2012), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2012/m-12-
18.pdf ("This Directive requires that to the fullest extent possible, agencies eliminate 
paper and use electronic recordkeeping. "). 
169. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal 
Communication Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System). 
170. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text. 
171. THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1403-04 (Elizabeth J. Jewell & Frank 
Abate eds., 2001). 
172. Stanko Kokole, Cyracus of Ancona and the Revival of Two Forgotten Ancient 
Personifications in the Rector's Palace of Dubrovnik, 49 RENAISSANCE Q. 225, 226 (2006). 
173. See F.W. Carter, Dubrovnik: The Early Development of a Pre-Industrial City, 47 
SLAVONIC & E. EUR. REV. 355, 358-BS (1969) (chronicling the growth of Dubrovnik as a 
major trade power and its relationship with Venice). 
174. See Robert Appelbaum, Utopian Dubrovnik, 1659: An English Fantasy, 7 
UTOPIAN STUD. 66, 69, 84-85 (1996) (describing Dubrovnik's governing body as limited to 
a select number of noble families who effectively ruled the city while the Rector lacked 
real authority). 
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that tourists can still visit.175 The Palace was simply a Panopticon 
(rather nice, though awfully hot in the summer).176 Through the 
Palace's servants and inescapable public rituals and public 
placement in the middle of the town, the tight-knit group of 
merchant families watched the Rector's every move.177 
In an age in which government can watch our every move, 
why can't we watch its moves? The E-Ectopanopticon could 
achieve this end in a variety of ways. Government actors could be 
required to videotape their ex parte meetings with private 
entities and place them online, along with automatically 
produced, easily searchable transcripts. Officials could even be 
placed in remote offices, such as in Montana or Alaska. They 
could, of course, still communicate with regulated parties, but 
only by email, which would be open to the public. Similarly, if the 
PRISM project records the metadata from our every phone call 
and Internet request, government phone calls should be equally 
transparent, particularly because the public foots the bill for all 
the chatter.178 The E-Ectopanopticon could even be a bit wacky. 
Using a technology like Google street view, as well as face 
recognition software, firms could easily track who eats lunch with 
whom at Washington, D.C. lobbying lunch hotspots, like The Palms 
or Tosca's.179 
Of course, such transparency might induce government actors 
to take evasive measures, such as the Federal Communications 
Commission's legal advisors' meetings to evade the Sunshine Act or 
the emergence of congressional caucuses to evade the open 
committee meetings, as discussed above.180 Yet, the same difficulties 
that individuals face in evading government surveillance would 
encumber government officials facing the E-Ectopanopticon. Our 
diminishing ability to evade electronic, computerized tracking is 
both the peril in terms of privacy-and the promise in terms of 
transparency--of our ever more online existence. 
175. Id. at 85. 
176. Compare Kokole, supra note 172, at 225-37 (describing the architectural 
structure of the Rector's Palace), with Fenster, supra note 12, at 668-69 (studying the 
structure of a Panopticon and analyzing how it makes subjects transparent to authority). 
177. See Appelbaum, supra note 174, at 69, 85 (describing how the Rector's primary 
role was to perform ceremonial and ritualistic practices); Carter, supra note 173, at 357 
fig.2 (providing a map with the location of the Rector's Palace within Dubrovnik). 
178. See David Bender, What You Need to Know About NSA Mass Acquisition of 
Telephony Metadata, 30 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAw, Sept. 2013, at 1, 9 (describing the 
PRISM project as "a massive program" where the NSA has open access to surveillance 
data). 
179. Manuel Roig-Franzia, Lunch at the 'Power Section', WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2009, 
atAl. 
180. See supra text accompanying notes 134-40. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
This Article has described a more complete understanding of 
transparency. The Article argues that transparency is a cost 
function that looks primarily at three factors: physical access, 
real-time information, and "computational" cost-the effort 
needed to derive useful and desired conclusions and deductions 
from the information provided.181 Computational transparency is 
inevitably normative because it requires government to conclude 
what is important or valuable for people to know.182 
In administrative functions, most would agree that keeping 
track of political and special interests is of great importance. 
Transparency, with attention to physical access, real-time 
information, and "computational" cost has the promise of 
providing a true portrait of political and special interest 
influence. 183 The E-Ectopanopticon simply applies to the 
government those techniques that the government uses to track 
us and, arguably, offers a goal for agency disclosure.184 
181. See supra Part II (discussing real-time information); Part III (discussing 
physical access); Part IV (discussing computational cost). 
182. See supra text accompanying notes 5-10 (discussing normative nature of 
computational transparency). 
183. See supra Part I (discussing how this transparency aims "to open the smoked· 
filled rooms to a more democratic cast of special interests"). 
184. See supra Part VII (proposing the idea of the E-Ectopanopticon to watch 
government actors in the same way the government watches its citizens). 
